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YAvuz v. 61 MM, LTD.: A NEW FEDERAL STANDARD-
APPLYING CONTRACTING PARTIES' CHOICE OF LAW TO
THE ANALYSIS OF FORUM SELECTION AGREEMENTS
INTRODUCTION
The international commercial world is fraught with danger. Parties
doing business abroad face the very real prospect of litigating, unexpect-
edly, in foreign courts under foreign law. Forum selection agreements
("FSAs")' and choice of law clauses ("COLs") 2 theoretically grant par-
ties autonomy to predetermine the courts in which they will litigate, as
well as the law under which they will litigate. For decades, however,
United States courts have turned a blind eye to the potential applicability
of the parties' chosen law to the FSA analysis, choosing instead to apply
United States law with little, if any, analysis. 3 This trend limits contract-
ing parties' autonomy by restricting their ability to pre-determine where
and how they will litigate.4 This trend also reintroduces the very uncer-
tainty that parties attempt to dispel by pre-selecting the law and forum
for future disputes.5 Recently, a Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals decision
addressed and flatly rejected this trend.6 In Yavuz v. 61 MM, Ltd., the
Tenth Circuit announced that courts must apply the parties chosen law to
forum selection questions.7  This new autonomy-based approach is in
line with the increasingly party-centered world of transnational trade and
provides foreseeability and certainty in international transactions. The
Yavuz opinion could be the spark that revolutionizes the way federal
courts approach international commercial cases. In order for this to hap-
pen, however, the Tenth Circuit needs to build upon its holding in Yavuz
by adding clarity and doctrinal support.
1. An FSA is "[a] contractual provision in which the parties establish the place (such as
country, state, or type of court) for specified litigation between them." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
681 (8th ed. 2004).
2. A choice of law clause is "[a] contractual provision by which the parties designate the
jurisdiction whose law will govern any disputes that may arise between the parties." Id at 258.
3. See GARY B. BORN & PETER B. RUTLEDGE, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN
UNITED STATES COURTS 501 (4th ed. 2007) ("[S]ome U.S. courts have concluded or assumed that
the validity and enforceability of forum clauses is governed by the law of the forum. Courts have
typically applied the forum's law without detailed consideration of other possibilities."); Jason Webb
Yackee, Choice of Law Considerations in the Validity & Enforcement of International Forum Selec-
tion Agreements: Whose Law Applies?, 9 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN. AFF. 43,63 (2004) ("United
States courts rarely engage in explicit conflict of laws analysis when determining whether an interna-
tional FSA is valid and enforceable.").
4. See Yackee, supra note 3, at 46.
5. See id.
6. Yavuz v. 61 MM, Ltd., 465 F.3d 418 (10th Cir. 2006).
7. See id. at 430.
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The scope of this article focuses on the United States federal courts'
enforcement and interpretation of FSAs that appear in contracts with
COLs. Part I of this comment considers the difficulties inherent in inter-
national trade that parties attempt to cure by employing COLs and FSAs.
Part II reviews the trends in circuit court case law concerning choice of
law in FSA enforcement and interpretation. Part III discusses the Tenth
Circuit's groundbreaking opinion in Yavuz.8 Part IV reviews circuit
cases arising after Yavuz. Part V analyzes the opinion in Yavuz and
raises questions concerning the effect it may have on courts, as well as
future litigating parties. Additionally, Part V briefly addresses the Con-
vention on Choice of Court Agreements9 and its effect on the Yavuz
holding if entered into force.' 0 Finally, in Part VI, this comment con-
cludes that, while ultimately a leap in the right direction, the Tenth Cir-
cuit's holding in Yavuz needs clarification.
I. THE PERILOUS WORLD OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE
International commercial law has reached a level of sophistication
and consistency that would have been inconceivable a few decades ago."
Advances by key international organizations such as the International
Institute for the Unification of Private Law, the United Nations Commis-
sion on International Trade Law, and the International Chamber of
Commerce have led to the promulgation of transnational commercial
law. 12 Developments in international transnational commercial law have
led to harmonization 13 and unification, where, in some cases, diverse
8. Id. at 418.
9. Hague Conference on Private International Law, Convention on Choice of Court Agree-
ments, June 30, 2005, 44 I.L.M. 1294, available at http://www.hcch.net/indexen.php?act=-
conventions.text&cid=98.
10. The Convention on Choice of Court Agreements requires two ratifications and has yet to
enter into force. Id. art. 31(1). As Mexico is the only ratifying country, the Convention on Choice
of Court Agreements is currently dormant. See Hague Conference on Private International Law,
Convention of 30 June 2005 on Choice of Court Agreements Status Table, http://www.hcch.net/
index en.php?act=conventions.status&cid=98 (last visited Feb. 5, 2008).
11. See Sandeep Gopalan, The Creation of International Commercial Law: Sovereignty
Felled?, 5 SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J. 267, 269 (2004) [hereinafter Gopalan, Sovereignty Felled?] (dis-
cussing international conventions on various types of law that previously would have been unthink-
able due to a "belief that these areas of law embody aspects of national sociopolitical history and
culture, and that national sensibilities may be so strong as to render any attempt at harmonization
unsuccessful.").
12. See Ross Cranston, Theorizing Transnational Commercial Law, 42 TEX INT'L L.J. 597,
606(2007).
13. Different authorities espouse different definitions of "harmonization." See Gopalan,
Sovereignty Felled?, supra note 11, at 274-76 (reviewing different authorities' definitions of "har-
monization"). In his article, The Creation of International Commercial Law: Sovereignty Felled?,
Professor Gopalan "formulate[s] a working definition of harmonization in the field of commercial
law: any attempt by whatever instrument (international convention, model laws, restatements,
model contracts, standard form contracts, codes of practice, or usages) to minimize or eliminate
discord between national commercial laws as they apply to international commercial transactions."
Id. at 276.
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systems of laws are synthesized, often into one set of rules that trumps
domestic law in the international context.'
4
However, while the unification and harmonization of international
commercial law progresses at a staggering pace, a broad expanse of the
international commercial plane remains in discord. The impetus to har-
monize international commercial law is direct evidence of the problems
inherent in the inconsistencies between the laws of various states.15 Es-
sentially, different states have different, conflicting laws' 6 or possibly no
law at all,17 for the governance of certain commercial transactions.
Given the inconsistency present in the commercial law of various
States, contracting with parties abroad is a daunting prospect. Potential
for unforeseen liabilities or loss of claims poses grave risks to parties
engaged in extraterritorial trade.' 8 The apparent solution to this peril
arises in the form of FSAs and COLs. In theory, FSAs afford parties
predictability and certainty.19 FSAs allow parties to reduce the myriad
possible forums for litigation to one with which the parties are familiar.20
FSAs should also settle issues of jurisdiction and venue prior to litiga-
tion, thus saving parties and courts time, money, and resources. 2' How-
ever, an FSA may not be the silver bullet parties seek to avoid the uncer-
tainty posed by dealing with parties abroad.22 Despite incorporating an
FSA into their contracts, parties may spend significant time and re-
sources litigating in a seized forum.23
Problems inevitably arise when one party files suit in a forum other
than the one contemplated in the FSA. In this situation, an FSA may
14. See Cranston, supra note 12, at 606.
15. See Sandeep Gopalan, New Trends in the Making of International Commercial Law, 23
J.L. & COM. 117,124-27 (2004) (reviewing effect of differing laws within Europe).
16. See e.g., Gopalan, Sovereignty Felled?, supra note 11, at 274 (discussing discrepancies
between approaches to secured credit laws in various states). It is important to note that, alone,
"[m]ere diversity in national laws is no reason to create international commercial law." Id. at 279.
Harmonization becomes necessary when "differences in national commercial laws are an impedi-
ment." Id.
17. See e.g., id (discussing problems posed by developing countries that do not have adequate
secured transactions law).
18. See id. at 279 (quoting DR. OLE LANDO & DR. CHRISTIAN V. BAR, COMMUNICATION ON
EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW: JOINT RESPONSE OF THE COMMISSION ON EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW
AND THE STUDY GROUP ON A EUROPEAN CIVIL CODE 9 (2001)).
19. See Young Lee, Forum Selection Clauses: Problems of Enforcement in Diversity Cases
and State Courts, 35 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 663, 663 (1997). For other virtues of FSAs, see
GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND FORUM SELECTION AGREEMENTS: DRAFTING
AND ENFORCING 3-4 (2d ed. 2006); Erin Ann O'Hara, Exploring the Need for International Har-
monization: The Jurisprudence and Politics of Forum Selection Clauses, 3 CHI. J. INT'L L. 301,
310-11 (2002).
20. See WILLIAM W. PARK, INTERNATIONAL FORUM SELECTION 12-13 (1995).
21. Michael E. Solimine, Forum Selection Clauses and the Privatization of Procedure, 25
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 51, 52 (1992); see also Lee, supra note 19, at 664.
22. See Lee, supra note 19, at 663 ("[W]ithin federal and state courts alike lurk difficulties
that a party may face in attempting to enforce a choice of forum.").
23. See id. at 665-66.
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have to clear several hurdles before the seized forum enforces it.24 Pro-
fessor Jason Webb Yackee 25 has organized conditions courts commonly
impose on FSAs into an analytic framework.26 The concepts employed
by Yackee that are relevant to this comment are enforceability in princi-
ple,27 quality of consent,28 and content of consent.29
Because courts require that FSAs meet certain standards, parties
will inevitably have to litigate, to some degree, in the seized forum.
Here, uncertainty 30 arises because a plethora of different systems of law
may be applicable to the FSA litigation. For instance, lexfori,31 lex loci
contractus,32 or lex rei sitae33 may be potentially applicable.34 The po-
tential for application of these various laws creates further complications
where the source of the applicable law is a federal system.35  Courts,
24. Yackee, supra note 3, at 47.
25. Professor Yackee's work deserves special consideration for two major reasons. First, he
is one of the few scholars to give the FSA/COL issue in-depth consideration. See Yavuz v. 61 MM,
Ltd., 465 F.3d 418, 427 (10th Cir. 2006). Second, the Tenth Circuit in Yavuz gave Yackee's work
considerable attention and apparently adopted his major conclusions. See id. at 430 (citing Yackee,
supra note 3, at 84-85); id. at 431 (quoting Yackee, supra note 3, at 83).
26. Professor Yackee's framework organizes FSA issues into the following categories: "en-
forceability in principle; formal validity; and non-formal (or 'substantive') validity." Yackee, supra
note 3, at 47. The third category, non-formal validity, is divided further into the following subcate-
gories: "reality of consent; the quality of consent; and the content of consent." Id. at 56.
27. Enforceability in principle exists where, in practice, a seized forum will enforce an FSA
subject to certain limitations. See id. at 47. In the United States, public policy concerns or unrea-
sonableness may limit FSA enforceability. See id. at 48-49. For discussion regarding the exceptions
limiting enforceability see infra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
28. Quality of consent falls under Yackee's broader concept of non-formal validity. Id at 56.
FSAs may be invalidated by "consensual vice, such as incapacity, mistake, fraud, duress, unreason-
ableness or unconscionability." Id. at 57.
29. As with quality of consent, content of consent falls under the concept of non-formal
validity. See id. at 56. Conceptually, content of consent focuses on the meaning and scope of an
FSA. See id. at 60-62. One issue commonly arising under content of consent, concerns whether the
parties intended the chosen forum to be exclusive or mandatory. See id. at 60. A second issue
concerns the claims to which an FSA is applicable (e.g., contract claims and/or tort claims). See id
at 62.
30. See Mo Zhang, Party Autonomy and Beyond: An International Perspective of Contrac-
tual Choice of Law, 20 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 511, 529 (2006) ("In the United States, choice of law
is one of the most complex areas of the conflict of laws.").
31. Lex fori, literally "the law of the forum," is used to denote "the law of the jurisdiction
where the case is pending." BLACK'S, supra note 1, at 929. For various reasons, lexfori appears to
be an inadequate choice of law in the international commercial context. See Giesela Ruhl, Methods
and Approaches in Choice of Law: An Economic Perspective, 24 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 801, 807
(2006) ("Prior to litigation lex fori provides for considerable uncertainty because parties do not know
where litigation will take place."); Yackee, supra note 3, at 83-84 (discussing the inadequacy of lex
fori).
32. Lex loci contractus is "[tihe law of the place where a contract is executed or to be per-
formed." BLACK'S, supra note 1, at 930. Of course, the place where the contract is executed may be
different from the place where the contract is to be performed. Thus, the designation of lex loci
contractus as governing requires the further step of deciding whether the law of the place of execu-
tion or place of performance governs the litigation.
33. Lex rei sitae is "[t]he law of the place where the property is situated." Id. at 931.
34. For additional choices of law, see Yackee, supra note 3, at 63.
35. See id.
YAVUZ V. 61 MM, LTD.
then, may have to decide whether the federal law or the state law ap-
plies.36
Another available option, one that should dispense with the lack of
predictability, efficiency, and certainty 37 in a manner analogous to FSA
inclusion, is the law chosen by the parties as evidenced by a COL in their
contract. Where FSAs limit the number of potential fori to one,38 COLs
limit the potential systems of law to one chosen by the parties.39 Theo-
retically, a COL should serve as a safety net for parties who, unexpect-
edly, find themselves litigating in a forum not contemplated in the FSA.
While the parties must litigate in an unforeseen place, at least they will
be able to litigate pursuant to a familiar and foreseeable law.40 Presuma-
bly, as the parties drafted the FSA with a particular law in mind, applica-
tion of that law to the litigated FSA issues should lead to an efficient,
foreseeable resolution.
This seemingly appropriate solution to choice of law problems in
FSA interpretation and enforcement has not been realized in the United
States federal court system.41  For the most part, United States courts
have failed to address adequately questions concerning the law applica-
ble to FSA interpretation and enforcement.42 For various reasons, the
possibility that the law chosen by the contracting parties might vie with
lexfori in applicability appears largely to have evaded these courts' at-
tention.43 Overwhelmingly, courts have used lexfori in interpreting and
enforcing FSAs in international agreements, notwithstanding the inclu-
sion of COLs.44 Because courts generally refrain from conducting in-
depth analyses concerning the law applicable to FSA validity and en-
forcement,45 the rationale for applying lex fori is somewhat enigmatic.46
Part II reviews the development and application of the federal standard
36. Id.
37. See Zhang, supra note 30, at 512 (discussing an international business transactional practi-
tioner's view of choice of law clauses).
38. See Park, supra note 20, at 12.
39. See BORN, supra note 19, at 119.
40. See Zhang, supra note 30, at 560 ("[l]t is important that the actors in international com-
merce have the security of knowing the possible legal consequences of their commercial activities in
a certain and predicable way. Allowing parties to specify the governing law through an agreement
under party autonomy will definitely help reach that goal.").
41. In fact, it appears that choice of law clause enforcement in United States courts in general
is neither reliable nor consistent. See id. at 533 ("[For a foreign lawyer or even a U.S. lawyer, it is
indeed a headache to predict the outcome of a contractual choice of law clause in U.S. courts be-
cause often the issue is dependent on the decision of a particular court undertaken on a case-by-case
basis.").
42. See Yackee, supra note 3, at 63 ("United States' [sic] courts rarely engage in explicit
conflict of laws analysis when determining whether an international FSA is valid and enforceable.").
43. See id. at 67 ("[United States'] [sic] courts tend instead to reflexively apply lex fori, even
when the contract contains an explicit choice of law clause selecting the laws of another jurisdiction
to govern the contract as a whole.").
44. See id.
45. See id. at 63.
46. See id. at 84 ("It is unclear why courts have hesitated to apply choice of law clauses to
international FSA agreements contained therein ... ").
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and sets the stage on which the Tenth Circuit fashioned its groundbreak-
ing departure from the lexfori trend.
II. FSAs IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
This section begins with a brief review of the history of the federal
courts' stance on FSAs. Next, it reviews more current circuit court case
law concerning FSA enforceability. The third part of this section re-
views circuit court case law concerning FSA interpretation. All of the
circuit cases reviewed in this section concern agreements that incorporate
FSAs and COLs. The common theme running through these cases is the
circuit courts' tendency to overlook the potential applicability of the law
chosen by the parties, as evidenced by COLs, to the interpretation and
enforceability of FSAs. The result of this approach is that foreign parties
find themselves litigating in an unforeseen forum pursuant to an unfore-
seen law.
A. Casting the Mold: M/S Bremen & Unterweser Reederel, GmBH v.
Zapata Off-Shore Co.
During the period leading up to the mid-1900's, federal courts gave
little regard to FSAs.47 These courts considered contractual agreements
designating alternate fora an impermissible "ouster" of their jurisdic-
tion.48 However, in MIS Bremen & Unterweser Reederel, GmBH v. Za-
pata Off-Shore Co.,49 the Supreme Court emphatically renounced the
"ouster" doctrine. 50 In Bremen, the Court crafted a new doctrine holding
FSAs "prima facie valid" and enforceable absent a showing by the resist-
ing party that enforcement would be "unreasonable., 5' The "unreason-
ableness" exception to prima facie validity constitutes the cornerstone
for rejection of FSAs in the United States.5 2 Articulations of the circum-
stances that precipitate activation of the exception vary slightly from
circuit to circuit, but overall are consistent.
53
47. See Nauert v. Nava Leisure USA, Inc., No. 99-1073, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 6862, at *5
(10th Cir. April 14, 2000); Michael Gruson, Forum Selection Clauses in International and Interstate
CommercialAgreements, 1982 U. ILL. L. REv. 133, 138 ("Before 1955, federal courts... generally
entertained suits brought in violation of forum-selection clauses."); Yackee, supra note 3, at 47.
48. See Gruson, supra note 47, at 138-46 for an in-depth overview of decisions during the
"ouster" period. See also Yackee, supra note 3, at 48.
49. 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
50. Yackee, supra note 3, at 48 (referring to Bremen, 407 U.S. 1).
51. Bremen, 407 U.S. at 10.
52. See Yackee, supra note 3, at 48-49.
53. In Richards v. Lloyd's of London, 135 F.3d 1289, 1294, (9th Cir. 1998) (citing and quot-
ing Bremen, 407 U.S. at 12-13, 15, 18), the Ninth Circuit advised that the following circumstances
raise the exception:
[F]irst, if the inclusion of the clause in the agreement was the product of fraud or over-
reaching; second, if the party wishing to repudiate the clause would effectively be de-
prived of his day in court were the clause enforced; and third, "if enforcement would con-
travene a strong public policy of the forum in which suit is brought."
[Vol. 85:3
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Notwithstanding doubts as to the strength of the Court's rationale in
crafting the rule in Bremen,54 as well as to the applicability of its princi-
ples in diversity cases,55 courts have followed the standard it set with
considerable allegiance. 6
B. Enforceability in Principle57 and Consensual Vice: 58 The Lloyd's
Cases
During the 1990's, Lloyd's of London ("Lloyd's")59 and various en-
tities within its structure became targets of a flurry of litigation initiated
by certain Names60 who alleged misconduct by Lloyd's and various in-
Similarly, in Haynsworth v. The Corporation, 121 F.3d 956, 963 (5th Cir. 1997) (citing and quoting
Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 595 (1991)), the Fifth Circuit advised that the
potential for unreasonableness is present in the following circumstances:
(1) the incorporation of the forum selection clause into the agreement was the product of
fraud or overreaching; (2) the party seeking to escape enforcement "will for all practical
purposes be deprived of his day in court" because of the grave inconvenience or unfair-
ness of the selected forum; (3) the fundamental unfairness of the chosen law will deprive
the plaintiff of a remedy; or (4) enforcement of the forum selection clause would contra-
vene a strong public policy of the forum state.
The third factor here is curious in that it appears to contemplate an automatic application of the
chosen forums law (i.e., if the parties litigate in their chosen forum, they will litigate under that
forum's law). It is questionable whether such a presumption is warranted. See GARY B. BORN,
INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS 373 (4th ed. 2007) (distinguishing
between COLs and FSAs and noting that inclusion of an FSA may not automatically incorporate the
chosen forum's law). A valid and enforceable FSA, alone, does not necessarily implicate the law of
the chosen forum. See id. It would appear that factor three here belongs in a choice of law analysis
rather than a forum selection analysis. However, as will be seen infra notes 82, 93, courts, in prac-
tice, blur the distinction between choice of law and forum selection.
54. See Linda S. Mullenix, Another Choice of Forum, Another Choice of Law: Consensual
Adjudicatory Procedure in Federal Court, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 291,307-13 (1988).
55. See Sun Forest Corp. v. Shvili, 152 F. Supp. 2d 367, 381 n.22 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (question-
ing the Second Circuit's application of Bremen to diversity actions); Mullenix, supra note 54, at 306
("In the major cases in which the Court has considered a problem of consensual procedure, it has
never clearly and affirmatively stated that such a doctrine of consensual jurisdiction applies in fed-
eral courts sitting on purely domestic federal cases."); Yackee, supra note 3, at 48.
56. See Mullenix, supra note 54, at 307 ("The current doctrine of consensual adjudicatory
procedure enforced throughout the federal court system is based on Supreme Court pronouncements
in The Bremen."); Yackee, supra note 3, at 48 ("[F]ederal courts have widely embraced Bremen's
principle of "prima facie validity."); Gruson, supra note 47, at 149 ("Federal courts have universally
agreed that the teaching of Bremen is not limited to admiralty cases nor to cases involving the selec-
tion of a foreign forum but applies to all forum-selection clauses .....
57. See supra note 27 (discussing enforceability in principle).
58. See supra note 28 (giving types of consensual vice).
59. Lloyd's is a 300-year-old market in which individual and corporate underwriters known as
"Names" underwrite insurance. The Corporation of Lloyd's, which is also known as the Society of
Lloyd's, provides the building and personnel necessary to the market's administrative operations.
The Corporation is run by the Council of Lloyd's, which promulgates "Byelaws," regulates the
market, and generally controls Lloyd's administrative functions. Haynsworth v. The Corporation,
121 F.3d 956, 958 (5th Cir. 1997); see also James Gange, Richards v. Lloyd's of London: The Ninth
Circuit Denies Access to the Securities Laws to American Investors, 24 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 625, 632-
33 (discussing the Lloyd's market).
60. "Loosely speaking, Names are investors in Lloyd's syndicates, the entities that nominally
underwrite insurance risk." Roby v. Corporation of Lloyd's, 996 F.2d 1353, 1356 (2d Cir. 1993).
"Names must become members of Lloyd's in order to participate in the market. Prospective mem-
bers are solicited and assisted in the process of joining by Member's Agents, whose duties to the
Names are fiduciary in nature." Haynsworth, 121 F.3d at 959; see also Gange, supra note 59, at
632-34 (discussing Names).
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siders within the Lloyd's structure.61 On appeal, the fate of these cases
often turned on whether the FSA in the General Undertaking, 62 "the stan-
dardized contract between Lloyd's and the individual Names" 63 was en-
forceable in principle, or if the presence of exceptions to the doctrine of
primafacie validity should bar enforcement. The Lloyd's litigation pre-
sents an interesting backdrop for FSA consideration across the circuits
because it required a number of the circuit courts to determine the en-
forceability of a single FSA. While the methodologies employed in these
circuit cases varied to a degree, the results were strikingly uniform.
1. The Tenth Circuit: Riley v. Kingsley Underwriting Agencies,
Ltd.
In Riley v. Kingsley Underwriting Agencies, Ltd.,64 the Tenth Cir-
cuit addressed the enforceability of the FSA in the General Undertaking
65
and a separate arbitration clause 66 contained in agreements concerning
underwriting in the Lloyd's market.67 The Riley litigation arose when an
individual Name brought a number of claims against Lloyd's and certain
other parties, alleging various violations of federal securities law, Colo-
rado state securities law, and common law fraud.68 The district court
determined that the arbitration clause, the FSA, and the COL were valid
61. See, e.g., Haynsworth, 121 F.3d 956.
62. Concerning forum selection and choice of law, the 1986 General Undertaking states:
2.1 The rights and obligations of the parties arising out of or relating to the Member's
membership of, and/or underwriting of insurance business at, Lloyd's and any other mat-
ter referred to in this Undertaking shall be governed by and construed in accordance with
the laws of England
2.2 Each party hereto irrevocably agrees that the courts of England shall have exclusive
jurisdiction to settle any dispute and/or controversy of whatsoever nature arising out of or
relating to the Member's membership of, and/or underwriting of insurance business at,
Lloyd's and that accordingly any suit, action or proceeding (together in this Clause 2 re-
ferred to as "Proceedings "') arising out of or relating to such matters shall be brought in
such courts and, to this end, each party hereto irrevocably agrees to submit to the juris-
diction of the courts of England and irrevocably waives any objection which it may have
now or hereafter to (a) any Proceedings being brought in any such court as is referred to
in this Clause 2 and (b) any claim that any such Proceedings have been brought in an in-
convenient forum and further irrevocably agrees that a judgment in any Proceedings
brought in the English courts shall be conclusive and binding upon each party and may be
enforced in the courts of any other jurisdiction.
2.3 The choice of law and jurisdiction referred to in this Clause 2 shall continue in full
force and effect in respect of any dispute and/or controversy of whatsoever nature arising
out of or relating to any of the matters referred to in this Undertaking notwithstanding
that the Member ceases, for any reason, to be a Member of, or to underwrite insurance
business at, Lloyd's.
Id. at 959-60 (emphasis added).
63. Id. at 959.
64. 969 F.2d 953 (10th Cir. 1992).
65. See supra note 62.
66. The Supreme Court has found that arbitration clauses are "a specialized kind of forum-
selection clause that posits not only the situs of suit but also the procedure to be used in resolving the
dispute." Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 519 (1974). However, this article concerns
only traditional FSAs.
67. Riley, 969 F.2d at 954.
68. Id. at 956.
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and enforceable. 69  Accordingly, the claims were dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction.70
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit engaged in a reflexive application of
federal law to consider the enforceability of the FSA, and confusingly the
COL.71 Despite the presence of the COL72 within the General Undertak-
ing,73 and its determination that the COL should be enforced,74 the court
did not consider whether it applied to the FSA. Instead, the court em-
barked on an analysis of FSA enforceability pursuant to a broad interpre-
tation of federal FSA law. In its recitation of the relevant case law, the
court reviewed the policy considerations supporting deference to FSAs.76
Echoing Bremen, the court stated that FSAs are "prima facie valid" 77 and
noted the heavy burden placed on the resisting party to rebut validity by
showing fraud or overreaching.78 The court also recognized that resisting
parties face a similar burden in showing unreasonableness or injustice of
enforcement.79
The court next turned its attention to the appellant Name's argu-
ment80 that enforcement of the FSA and COL would effectively deny
him his day in court because pursuing his case in an English court, under
English law, rather than in a United States court, under United States
law, would be considerably more onerous. 81 Reasoning that requiring
parties to litigate under laws different from or less propitious than United
States laws was not a bar to enforceability 2 and that English courts
would not be unfair,83 the court found that the Plaintiff had not met the
69. Id. at 955.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 956-58.
72. The court's failure to incorporate the COL in the FSA analysis is particularly striking
considering its statement that "[a] contractual provision specifying in advance the forum in which
disputes shall be litigated and the law to be applied is, therefore, an almost indispensable precondi-
tion to achievement of the orderliness and predictability essential to any international business trans-
action." Id. at 957 (emphasis added).
73. See Haynesworth v. The Corporation, 121 F.3d 956, 959-60 (5th Cir. 1997).
74. Riley, 969 F.2d at 958.
75. See id; see also Roby v. Corp. of Lloyd's, 996 F.2d 1353, 1362 (2d Cir. 1993) (expressing
reluctance "to interpret the Supreme Court's precedent quite so broadly" as the Tenth Circuit in
Riley).
76. See Riley, 969 F.2d at 957-58.
77. Id. at 957 (quoting MS Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 10 (1972)).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Prior to reviewing the FSA case law, the court summarily rejected the appellant's first
argument that the FSA and COL would act as a waiver of his substantive rights under federal securi-
ties laws and, thus, should not be enforced on public policy grounds. Id. at 957.
81. Id. at 958.
82. Id (citing Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 111 S. Ct. 1522, 1528 (1991)). The
court's analysis here is curious in that it apparently entertained a choice of law challenge under the
guise of a rebuttal to FSA enforcement, thus blurring the distinction between the two. In fact,
throughout its analysis the court referred to the COL and the FSA in tandem.
83. Id.
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heavy burden imposed on parties resisting FSA enforcement, 84 and de-
cided that the FSA and COL should be enforced.85
2. The Second Circuit: Roby v. Corporation of Lloyd's
In Roby v. Corporation of Lloyd's, 86 the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals considered FSA validity and enforceability in the context of a
suit brought by over one hundred Names against Lloyd's and various
other parties connected to the Lloyd's market.87 The Names entered into
implicit or explicit agreements with the defendants.88 Each agreement
contained a COL and either an FSA or an arbitration clause.89 In their
suit, the Names alleged violations of United States securities laws and
RICO laws.90
In large part, the Second Circuit's methodology was similar to that
of the Riley court because it applied federal law without considering the
applicability of the law chosen by the parties. However, while agreeing
with its ultimate result, the Second Circuit voiced a departure from the
Tenth Circuit's broad interpretation of federal law in Riley.9'
In a narrower interpretation of federal FSA law, the Second Circuit
focused on the exceptions to the prima facie enforceable rule, with spe-
cial emphasis on the public policy exception. 92 Forcefully, the court ad-
vised that, upon a showing by the plaintiffs that English remedies inade-
quately deter types of consensual vice, it would implement the public
policy exception to enforceability. 94 However, finding the Names inca-
pable of making the requisite showing,95 the court affirmed the district
court's dismissal of the case96 for improper venue on the basis of the
FSAs and arbitration agreements.97
84. See id.
85. Id.
86. 996 F.2d 1353 (1993).
87. Id. at 1358.
88. See id. at 1357-58.
89. See id.
90. See id. at 1358.
91. Id. at 1362 (quoting Riley v. Kingsley Underwriting Agencies, Ltd., 969 F.2d 953, 957
(1992) ("[W]hen an agreement is truly international, as here, and reflects numerous contacts with the
foreign forum, the Supreme Court has quite clearly held that the parties' choice of law and forum
selection provisions will be given effect.")).
92. Id. at 1365.
93. Specifically, the court mentioned "fraud, misrepresentation or inadequate disclosure." Id.
Notice, again, that questions of the chosen forum's law find their way into the FSA analysis.
94. See id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 1366.
97. Id. at 1357.
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3. The Fifth Circuit: Haynsworth v. The Corporation
Haynsworth v. The Corporation98 concerned two consolidated cases
that arose during the Lloyd's litigation. Factually, the suits were similar
in that both arose from circumstances concerning liability for asbestos
and toxic waste risks.99 The district court dismissed the first case based
on the FSA and COL in the General Undertaking. 00 In the second case,
however, the district court declined to dismiss, choosing instead to cer-
tify the FSA/COL question for interlocutory appeal.' 0 '
Consolidating the cases, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals exam-
ined whether consensual vice'0 2 and public policy 10 3 barred enforcement
of the FSA. Departing from the rote application of federal law in Riley
and Roby, the Fifth Circuit briefly considered the applicability of Texas
law to the enforceability question.1' 4 However, despite recognizing that
all of the Names were parties to the General Undertaking and, conse-
quently, the FSA and COL, 05 the court gave no thought to the potential
applicability of the COL to the FSA determination. Tracking prior deci-
sions extending the applicability of Bremen to non-admiralty cases,
10 6
including diversity cases, 0 7 the court settled on federal law. 0 8 Applying
federal law, the Fifth Circuit rejected the plaintiffs' contentions that con-
sensual vice and public policy barred enforcement of the FSA.'09
C. Content of Consent: Permissive or Mandatory
Along with primary considerations of enforceability, FSA analysis
has brought the actual content of FSAs to courts' attention. 0 One of the
major issues concerning the content of an FSA is whether the designation
of forum is mandatory"' or permissive. 12 Whether an FSA is manda-
98. 121 F.3d 956 (5th Cir. 1997).
99. See id. at 960.
100. Id. at 961.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 963-65 (considering and rejecting plaintiffs' claims of fraud and overreaching).
103. Id. at 965-70 (considering and rejecting plaintiffs' contention that enforcement of the FSA
and COL would be unreasonable "because [the FSA and COL clause] contravenes public policy as
embodied in the antiwaiver provisions of federal securities law, Texas securities law, and the Texas
DTPA.").
104. See id. at 961-62.
105. See id. at 960.
106. Id. at 962 (citing Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Manges, 900 F.2d 795, 799 (5th Cir. 1990)
(bankruptcy case); AVC Nederland B.V. v. Atrium Inv. P'ship, 740 F.2d 148, 156-60 (2d Cir. 1984)
(federal securities fraud case); In re Fireman's Fund Ins. Cos., 588 F.2d 93, 95 (5th Cir. 1979)
(Miller Act)).
107. Id. (citing Int'l Software Sys. v. Amplicon, 77 F.3d 112, 114-15 (5th Cir. 1996)).
108. Id.
109. Id. at 965,970.
110. See Yackee, supra note 3, at 60-61 (discussing "content of consent").
111. Courts and authorities use the terms "mandatory" and "exclusive" interchangeably when
describing FSAs that designate one forum as the only applicable forum for dispute resolution.
Compare Yackee, supra note 3, at 60 (discussing courts' analyses in determining "whether the
parties intended [an] FSA to be exclusive or permissive") (emphasis added), with id. at 86 (discuss-
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tory or permissive will play a major role in whether it is enforced." 3
Moreover, the type of law used will likely play a decisive role in deter-
mining whether an FSA is permissive or mandatory. 14 Possibly due to
quality of the FSA in the General Undertaking," 15 the courts considering
the Lloyd's cases did not reach the issue of whether it was mandatory or
permissive. The following cases review different circuit's approaches to
the mandatory/permissive question.
1. The Tenth Circuit: K & V Scientific Co., Inc. v. Bayerische
Motoren Werke Aktiengesellschaft
In K & V Scientific Co., Inc. v. Bayerische Motoren Werke Akti-
engesellschaft,l 16 the Tenth Circuit addressed the issue of whether an
FSA in a confidentiality agreement that also included a COL was manda-
tory or permissive. 1 7 The case arose after the termination of a working
arrangement in which the plaintiff and defendant exchanged confidential
information.' 18 The plaintiff alleged that, after severing the working rela-
tionship, the defendant continued to pursue "development and manufac-
ture" of products "designed and promoted" by the plaintiff. 19 Determin-
ing that the FSA at issue unambiguously designated the courts of Munich
as the exclusive forum, the district court dismissed the case for improper
venue. 1
2 0
At the appellate level, K & V Scientific differed from the Lloyd's
cases in that the meaning of the FSA, not its enforceability, was at is-
sue.121 While its analysis ultimately rested on federal law, the Tenth Cir-
cuit was apparently cognizant that there may be a question as to the ap-
122 12plicable law. However, the court declined to address the issue. 23 The
Tenth Circuit noted the district court's conclusion that federal law gov-
erned the interpretation of the FSA.' 24 As the parties failed to object,
25
ing the Eighth Circuit's choice of law in determining "whether an FSA was permissive or manda-
tory") (emphasis added).
112. See id, at 60-61.
113. See id.
114. See id. at 60-62 (discussing differences between United States and European determina-
tions concerning whether an FSA is permissive or exclusive).
115. See supra note 62.
116. 314 F.3d 494 (lOth Cir. 2002).
117. The FSA and choice of law clause in the confidentiality agreement stated, "Jurisdiction
for all and any disputes arising out of or in connection with this agreement is Munich. All and any
disputes arising out of or in connection with this agreement are subject to the laws of the Federal
Republic of Germany." Id. at 496-97.
118. Id.
119. Seeid. at 497.
120. See id.
121. Id. at 498 ("Plaintiff does not dispute the general validity of the forum selection clause
contained in the parties' ... confidentiality agreement.").
122. See id. at 497 n.4.
123. See id,
124. See id.
125. This point raises two questions. First, should courts raise the applicability of COLs to
FSA issues sua sponte? Second, that parties fail to argue the applicability of their chosen law to
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the Tenth Circuit considered the district court's conclusion the law of the
case. 126
After reviewing the federal law on point, the Tenth Circuit dis-
agreed with the district court's finding that the FSA was exclusive.
27
The appellate court noted that the FSA only addressed jurisdiction, pre-
sumably, as opposed to forum. 28 Additionally, the court pointed out the
lack of exclusive terms, such as "'exclusive,' 'sole,' or 'only"' in the
FSA. 129  Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's
judgment and remanded for further proceedings.'
30
2. The Fifth Circuit: Caldas & Sons, Inc. v. Neblett
In Caldas & Sons, Inc. v. Neblett,t31 the Fifth Circuit reached a con-
clusion similar to the Tenth Circuit's determination in K & V Scientific.
However, in passing, the court in Caldas & Sons raised an issue that in-
ferably may separate the choice of law applicable to an FSA's enforce-
ability and an FSA's interpretation.1
32
Caldas & Sons arose from alleged misconduct concerning a com-
plex series of land exchanges. 33 After the plaintiffs sued, the defendants
filed motions to dismiss based on an FSA.134 Determining the FSA per-
missive, the district court declined to dismiss.'
35
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit's analysis focused mainly on the man-
datory/permissive issue, but also included a brief, yet curious, discussion
of enforceability. 36 Ultimately, the court decided the enforceability is-
sue mooted by its determination that the FSA was permissive. 37 How-
ever, in a footnote, the court acknowledged a circuit split over the issue
of the law 38 applicable to the determination of FSA enforceability. 39
FSA issues, and fail to object when courts apply federal law, calls the much heralded COL virtue of
reliability into question. Presumably, if parties drafted FSAs with the expectation that they would be
subject to the COL, that expectation would be evidenced in the litigation.
126. See K & V Scientific, 314 F.3d at 497 n.4.
127. Id. at 498-99.
128. See id. at 500.
129. See id.
130. Id. at 501.
131. 17 F.3d 123 (5th Cir. 1994).
132. In fact, that the law applicable to validity and enforcement may be different from the law
applicable to interpretation is a point that has been acknowledged by courts, see, e.g., Phillips v.
Audio Active Ltd., 494 F.3d 378, 382 (2d Cir. 2007), and academics, see, e.g., BORN, supra note 53,
at 431 ("[T]he law that governs the validity and enforceability of a forum agreement need not neces-
sarily be the same as that governing the interpretation of the agreement.").
133. Caldas & Sons, 17 F.3d at 124-26.
134. Id. The FSA in question stated, "the law and courts of Zurich shall be applicable." Id. at
127.
135. Id. at 126.
136. See id at 127.
137. Id. at 127 n.3.
138. In recognizing the circuit split on the choice of law issue, the Fifth Circuit cited Manetti-
Farrow, Inc. v. Gucci America, Inc., 858 F.2d 509, 512-13 (9th Cir. 1988). Caldas & Sons, 17 F.3d
at 127 n.3. In Manetti-Farrow, the Ninth Circuit addressed, at length, the question of whether state
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Additionally, the court noted that the Fifth Circuit had not ruled on the
issue. 140  Despite acknowledging that there may be a question as to the
law applicable to enforcement of an FSA, the court proceeded to apply
federal law to determine if the FSA was mandatory or permissive with-
out raising the choice of law question.' 41 The potential implication here
is that different FSA analyses may be subject to different law.
42
In its analysis, the court found that the term "shall" was not indica-
tive of the parties' intent to designate the courts of Zurich as the exclu-
sive forum. 14 3 Instead, the court decided that the language of the FSA
merely provided that the parties submitted to the personal jurisdiction of
the courts of Zurich. 144 According to the court, exclusivity requires lan-
guage that is "clear, unequivocal and mandatory.' 45  Thus, the circuit
court concluded that the district court was correct in retaining jurisdic-
tion.
14 6
III. CHANGING COURSE: YA Vuz V. 61 MM, LTD.
Review of circuit case law shows a clear pattern of federal circuit
courts applying federal law to determine FSA validity and enforceability,
notwithstanding otherwise valid COLs in the parties' contracts. Courts
conduct many of these applications without consideration of an alterna-
tive system of law.147 Even where the question of choice of law arises,
circuit courts have managed to circumvent the issue. 148 Where circuits
do examine the choice of law issue, their examinations focus on state and
federal law, not federal and foreign law. 49 Unfortunately, the available
or federal law should be applied to FSA enforcement for the purposes of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins.
Manetti-Farrow, 858 F.2d at 512 (discussing Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)). The
determination of the applicable law turned on whether an FSA is procedural and subject to federal
law, or substantive and subject to state law. Id. The Erie issue presents an interesting potential
parallel to the choice between lex fori and the law chosen by the contracting parties. Switching
roles, if an FSA is procedural, it is governed by lex fori. Relatedly, if an FSA is substantive, it
should be governed by the law chosen by the contracting parties. Whether the Erie principles in
domestic law are freely transferable to the international context is unclear. In Phillips v. Audio
Active Ltd., 494 F.3d 378, 384 (2d Cir. 2007), the Second Circuit cited Jones v. Weibrecht, 901 F.2d
17, 18-19 (2d Cir. 1990), in support of its conclusion that FSA enforceability is a procedural matter
and, thus, governed by federal law rather than English law. Jones, however, was a domestic case
concerned with a domestic FSA and, there, the Second Circuit reached its determination that federal
law applies to FSA enforcement via Erie. Id. at 19. Certainly, this raises an interesting question.
139. Caldas & Sons, 17 F.3d at 127 n.3 (citing Manetti-Farrow, 858 F.2d at 512).
140. Id.
141. See id. at 127-28.
142. The Second Circuit addressed this issue in a 2007 decision. See Phillips, 494 F.3d at 384.
Phillips is discussed infra Part IV.B.
143. See Caldas & Sons, 17 F.3d. at 127-28.
144. See id. at 128.
145. See id.
146. Id.
147. See Roby v. Corporation of Lloyd's, 996 F.2d 1353, 1356-57 (2d Cir. 1993); Riley v.
Kingsley Underwriting Agencies, Ltd., 969 F.2d 953, 958 (10th Cir. 1992).
148. See K & V Scientific Co., Inc. v. Bayerische Motoren Werke Aktiengesellschaft, 314 F.3d
494, 497 n.4 (1Oth Cir. 2002); Caldas & Sons, 17 F.3d at 127 n.3.
149. See Haynsworth v. The Corporation, 121 F.3d 956, 961-62 (5th Cir. 1997).
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case law does not shed light on the rationale for the utter disregard of
COLs in FSA analysis. A recent Tenth Circuit opinion departed from
this lexfori trend.' 0 In Yavuz v. 61 MM, Ltd.,15 1 the Tenth Circuit ad-
dressed, as an issue of first impression, 152 the applicability of a COL des-




Yavuz arose out of an investment relationship, concerning property
in Tulsa, Oklahoma, between an individual plaintiff of Turkish citizen-
ship ("Yavuz") 155 and a defendant Swiss corporation ("FPM") 156 con-
trolled and directed 57 by an individual defendant of dual Swiss and Syr-
ian citizenship ("Adi"). 58 In the early 1980s, Yavuz began an invest-
ment relationship with Adi.'59 Eventually, Yavuz learned of certain mis-
conduct on the part of Adi.' 60 After Yavuz confronted Adi, the parties
reached a settlement reflected by a fiduciary agreement. 16 1 This fiduci-
ary agreement contained an FSA and COL.' 62 Several years after enter-
ing into the fiduciary agreement, Yavuz raised questions concerning his
investments. 63 At some point thereafter, Adi and FPM allegedly col-
luded with 61 MM Corp. and 61 MM, Ltd., an Oklahoma corporation, in
an effort to supply Yavuz with inaccurate information regarding his in-
vestments. 164
Yavuz sued in state court.165 The case was removed to federal dis-
trict court where defendants Adi and FPM moved to dismiss for, among
other things, improper venue.' 66  Based on the FSA, the district judge
granted the motion to dismiss for improper venue.' 6 7 However, in a curi-
150. See Yavuz v. 61 MM, Ltd., 465 F.3d 418 (10th Cir. 2006).
151. Id.
152. See id. at 427.
153. Id. at 422-23.
154. Id. at 422.
155. Id. at 421.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 422.
158. Id. at 421.
159. Id. at 422.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. The FSA and choice of law clause stated, "[t]his convention is governed by the Swiss law,
in particular article 394 and following of the Swiss Code of Obligation. Place of courts is Fribourg."
Id. at 422-23.
163. Id. at 423.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 422.
166. Id at 424.
167. Id.
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ous explanation, the district judge employed a rationale that is strikingly




In Yavuz, the Tenth Circuit's FSA analysis was groundbreaking in
several respects. First, the court recognized that the parties' choice of
foreign law was an issue. 170  Second, the court recognized that, with a
few notable exceptions, 171 both the judiciary and academia had over-
looked the issue. 72 Additionally, the court identified two related prob-
lems in United States case law concerning the forum selection issue.
73
First, in considering FSA validity and enforceability, courts had failed to
examine fully the relevant choice of law implications. 74 Second, instead
of engaging in explicit analysis, notwithstanding COLs, courts "reflex-
ively apply lex fori.,', 75  Recognizing the existence of the choice of
law/forum selection issue,1 76 the lack of relevant authority on the issue,
177
and the tendency of United States courts to use lexfori,178 the Tenth Cir-
cuit set the stage upon which it would fashion a new model for applying
the law chosen by the contracting parties to the analysis of FSAs.
Treading new ground, the Tenth Circuit reached its decision con-
cerning the applicability of a COL to the analysis of an FSA by drawing
primarily from United States conflict of laws and contract principles, as
well as implications inherent in international commerce. 7 9 The court's
focus on conflict of laws and contracts principles mainly addressed the
implications of choice of law applicability to FSAs as it affects the con-
tracting parties.18  However, the court's consideration of international
trade policy reached further and addressed the implications of choice of
168. The parties apparently recognized this and "devote[d] substantial portions of their briefs to
debating whether the district court's dismissal can be affirmed under the doctrine of forum non
conveniens." See id. at 425. However, despite discussingforum non conveniens at length, the Tenth
Circuit held that "the court did not rule on that ground, and it would be inappropriate... to address
the matter in the first instance." See id. at 425-26.
169. Id. at 426-27.
170. See id. at 427 (noting that, to answer questions concerning the validity and enforceability
of a forum selection clause, "a court must first resolve a preliminary question: What law does it
apply to answer them?").
171. Id. (referring to TH Agric. & Nutrition, L.L.C. v. Ace European Group Ltd., 416 F. Supp.
2d 1054 (D. Kan. 2006) and Yackee, supra note 3, at 24).
172. Id.
173. See id.
174. Id. (quoting Yackee, supra note 3, at 67).
175. Id. (quoting Yackee, supra note 3, at 67).
176. See id.
177. See id.
178. Id. (quoting Yackee, supra note 3, at 67).
179. See id. at 427-30.
180. See id. at 427-28.
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law applicability in terms of the United States' interests in international
commerce. 18'
2. Principles of United States Conflict of Laws
Drawing from United States contracts and conflict of laws princi-
ples, the Tenth Circuit focused on two interrelated issues. First, the court
recognized the importance, and common practice, of interpreting con-
tracts pursuant to the contracting parties' choice of law.' 8 2 Because "[a]
forum-selection clause is part of the contract," the court saw no reason
why FSAs in international agreements should be governed by a law dif-
ferent from the law applicable to the rest of the contractual provisions,
i.e., the law chosen by the parties. 83 The court supported its position by
citing a prior Tenth Circuit case 184 in which the court stated "two 'prime
objectives' of contract law are 'to protect the justified expectations of the
parties and to make it possible for them to foretell with accuracy what
will be their rights and liabilities under the contract.""
85
The Tenth Circuit's concise application of traditional United States
conflict principles to the application of choice of law to FSAs appears to
provide a compelling answer. However, in making its determination, the
court made several presumptions that raise a number of difficult ques-
tions. This article addresses these questions infra Part V.
3. International Trade Policy
Transitioning from the straightforward analysis based on United
States conflict of laws principles, the Tenth Circuit next embarked on a
complex analysis of the implications of the law chosen for FSA interpre-
tation in terms of international commerce. 86 Here, the court reviewed
United States Supreme Court case law concerning the implications of
international commerce in regards to FSA enforceability. 87 The court
extended these principles to the applicability of COLs in FSA determina-
tions.188
Reviewing relevant Supreme Court case law concerning FSA en-
forcement, the Tenth Circuit identified the Court's rationale for granting
deference to FSAs.' 89 The overriding theme of these considerations ap-
pears to be that the growth of international commerce, and the United
181. See id. at 427-30.
182. Id. at 427-28 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 cmt. e
(1971)).
183. See idat 428 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 204 (1971)).
184. Boyd Rosene & Assocs. Inc. v. Kan. Mun. Gas Agency, 174 F.3d I l15, 1121 (10th Cir.
1999) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 cmt. e).
185. Yavuz, 465 F.3d at 428 (quoting BoydRosene, 174 F.3d at 1121).
186. See id. at 428-30.
187. See id.
188. See id.
189. Id. at 428.
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States' role in that growth, is dependent upon the predictability and secu-
rity contracting parties gain from choosing a particular forum.' 90 Quot-
ing Bremen, the Tenth Circuit recognized:
[I]n an era of expanding world trade and commerce, the absolute as-
pects of the doctrine of [a circuit precedent holding a forum-selection
clause unenforceable] have little place and would be a heavy hand
indeed on the future development of international commercial deal-
ings by Americans. We cannot have trade and commerce in world
markets and international waters exclusively on our terms, governed
by our laws, and resolved in our courts.
191
Similarly, the court noted the Bremen Court's conclusion that "[t]he
elimination of all such uncertainties by agreeing in advance on a forum
acceptable to both parties is an indispensable element in international
trade, commerce, and contracting."' 192 The Tenth Circuit highlighted the
Court's continued adherence to these principles, citing later Supreme
Court opinions, including Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-
Plymouth,193 in which the Court stated:
[W]e conclude that concerns of international comity, respect for the
capacities of foreign and transnational tribunals, and sensitivity to the
need of the international commercial system for predictability in the
resolution of disputes require that we enforce the parties' agreement,
even assuming that a contrary result would be forthcoming in a do-
mestic context.
1 94
The Tenth Circuit found the principles espoused by the Supreme
Court concerning FSA enforcement 95 especially germane to choice of
law applicability. 196 Accordingly, the court adopted these principles as
support for its conclusion that
[i]f the parties to an international contract agree on a forum-selection
clause that has a particular meaning under the law of a specific juris-
diction, and the parties agree that the contract is to be interpreted un-
der the law of that jurisdiction, respect for the parties' autonomy and
the demands of predictability in international transactions require
190. See id. at 428-30.
191. Id. at 429 (quoting M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1972)).
192. Id. (quoting Bremen, 407 U.S. at 13-14).
193. 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
194. Yavuz, 465 F.3d at 430 (quoting Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 629).
195. While the Tenth Circuit leaned heavily on the Supreme Court cases favoring FSA en-
forcement, it recognized inherent differences in those cases and the case at bar. Id. Apparently
distinguishing the Supreme Court cases from the case at bar, the Tenth Circuit noted that the FSA
issue in the Supreme Court cases was enforceability, not meaning. Id. However, it is unclear if the
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courts to give effect to the meaning of the forum-selection clause un-
der the chosen law .... 197
4. The Holding
After reviewing basic principles of United States conflict of laws, as
well as Supreme Court case law on the enforceability of forum selection
law and its pertinence to choice of law application, the Tenth Circuit
concluded that the reflexive application of lexfori was unacceptable.' 98
Accordingly, the court announced a new federal rule, stating "courts
should ordinarily honor an international commercial agreement's forum-
selection provision as construed under the law specified in the agree-
ment's choice-of-law provision.
"' 199
IV. CIRCUIT COURTS POST-YA VUZ
A. The Tenth Circuit: Missing the Boat in TH Agriculture & Nutrition,
LLC v. Ace European Group, Ltd.
TH Agriculture & Nutrition, LLC v. Ace European Group, Ltd.
200
presented the Tenth Circuit with an opportunity to clarify and expound
upon its holding in Yavuz. Regrettably, the Tenth Circuit declined.20'
TH Agriculture arose out of the alleged breach of insurance policies
connected to an FSA.20 2 The district court devoted the majority of its
opinion to issues concerning personal jurisdiction.0 3 However, after
concluding that it did not have personal jurisdiction over the defendants,
the district court stated that, if it did, the presence of the FSA would re-
quire dismissal for improper venue.204 The district court then proceeded
to run the gambit of applicable law in considering the validity and en-
forceability of the FSA.2 °5
First, the court considered whether the FSA was mandatory or per-
missive pursuant to Tenth Circuit law and Kansas state law.2°6 Finding
that, under both laws, the FSA would be permissive, the court declined to
determine which was ultimately applicable.20 7 Next, the court acknowl-
edged the defendants' assertion that Dutch law was applicable. 0 8 Faced
197. Id.
198. Id. at 430-31.
199. Id. at 430 (emphasis in original).
200. TH Agric. & Nutrition, LLC v. Ace European Group, Ltd. (THAgric. 11), 488 F.3d 1282
(10th Cir. 2007).
201. See id. at 1293 n.4.
202. TH Agriculture & Nutrition, LLC v. Ace European Group, Ltd. (TH Agric. 1), 416 F.
Supp. 2d 1054, 1062 (D. Kan. 2006).
203. See id at 1063-73.
204. See id. at 1074.
205. See id. at 1074-77.
206. See id. at 1074.
207. See id. (citing Excell, Inc. v. Sterling Boiler & Mech., Inc., 106 F.3d 318, 320-21 (10th
Cir. 1997)).
208. See id. at 1075.
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with a potentially applicable foreign law, the court opined that a choice
of law consideration is unnecessary absent conflict between the relevant
laws. 20 9 Following this principle, the court found that a conflict did exist
because, pursuant to Dutch law, the FSA was mandatory. 210 After identi-
fying the conflict, the court noted that the forum state's substantive law,
"including its choice-of-law rules," controls. 211 As Kansas was the fo-
rum state, the court proceeded to consider whether the foreign law cho-
sen by the parties was applicable to the FSA pursuant to Kansas law.
212
The Tenth Circuit recognized that Kansas courts had not addressed the
213issue. However, the Tenth Circuit decided that the Kansas Supreme
Court would reach a result similar to other courts214 that found COLs
applicable to FSA enforceability. 215  Thus, the court decided that Dutch
law was applicable to interpretation of the FSA.2 i6
After settling the question of the applicable law, the district court
further supported its designation of Dutch law, concerning the meaning
of the FSA, with rationale more in line with the Yavuz opinion.21 7 The
court also addressed the issue of enforceability as it concerns the parties
chosen law.218 With regard to the interpretation of the FSA, the court
focused on the plain language of the COL and the parties' intent.219 The
court acknowledged that the COL applied to the terms and conditions of
the parties' agreement. 220  The court found that "the forum selection
clause [was] such a 'term' or 'condition,"' so the COL applied. 22 ' This






214. See id. (citing Dunne v. Libbra, 330 F.3d 1062, 1064 (8th Cir. 2003) (enforcing Ohio
choice-of-law provision and applying Ohio law to determine the enforceability of a forum selection
clause); Lambert v. Kysar, 983 F.2d 1110, 1118-19 (1st Cir. 1998) (predicting that Massachusetts
courts would enforce Washington choice-of-law provision; applying Washington law to determine
the enforceability of a forum selection clause); Gen. Eng'g Corp. v. Martin Marietta Alumina, Inc.,
783 F.2d 352, 358 (3d Cir. 1986) (enforcing Maryland choice-of-law provision and applying Mary-
land law to determining the enforceability of a forum selection clause)).
215. See id.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 1076. This section of the court's opinion is curious in that it appears to be at odds
with its prior conflicts of law analysis. The two analyses are premised upon two different concepts.
The first considers United States conflict of laws principles. The second considers party autonomy
and party intent. While both analyses led to the same result, it is possible that, in other cases, they
would not. This raises the question of which analysis should trump the other. The Yavuz opinion
appears to favor the latter (i.e., the focus is on party autonomy and intent rather than the forum
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rationale was very much in line with the Tenth Circuit's rationale in Ya-
VUZ.222
Addressing enforceability, the court focused on the language of the
COL that stated "all matters arising hereunder shall be determined in
accordance with the law and practice of [a court of the Netherlands]."223
Focusing on the word "practice," the court found that the COL extended
past mere interpretation of the FSA and was applicable to the enforce-
ability of the FSA as well.224 Thus, the court, inferably, drew a line be-
tween interpretation of the FSA, presumably subject substantive to law,
and enforceability of the FSA, presumably subject to the practice of the
appropriate court.
225
Concerning the primary rationale for applying Dutch law, courts
would be hard pressed to develop a more labyrinthine analysis. 26 How-
ever, the court's consideration of the party's intent is in line with the
Yavuz opinion and expands 227 upon the notion of party autonomy. Ac-
cordingly, as the Yavuz opinion focused on the virtues of "certainty, pre-
dictability, and convenience" afforded to parties via FSAs and COLs,228
it would have been particularly appropriate, and timely, for the Tenth
Circuit to elucidate its position here. However, on appeal, the Tenth
Circuit confined its analysis strictly to the personal jurisdiction issue.
In light of Yavuz, the Tenth Circuit's failure to address the FSA is-
sue is puzzling. In Yavuz, the Tenth Circuit discussedforum non conven-
iens at length. 229 While the parties briefed the issue extensively, forum
non conveniens was not part of the district court's ruling.23° In TH Agri-
culture, however, the district court did base dismissal on improper venue
222. See Yavuz v. 61 MM, Ltd., 465 F.3d 418, 428 (10th Cir. 2006) ("A forum-selection clause
is part of the contract. We see no particular reason, at least in the international context, why a fo-
rum-selection clause, among the multitude of provisions in a contract, should be singled out as a
provision not to be interpreted in accordance with the law chosen by the contracting parties.").
223. THAgric. I, 416 F. Supp. 2d at 1076 (emphasis in original).
224. Id.
225. See id.
226. This round of analysis incorporated both United States federal and state law as well as the
law of a foreign nation. Contrasted with the court's second approach which focused on the intent of
the parties by looking to the language of the contract, the former approach appears exceedingly
complex.
227. This expansion concerns enforceability. In Yavuz, the Tenth Circuit did not explicitly
address enforceability in terms of the applicable law. See generally Yavuz, 465 F.3d 418. In TH
Agric. 1, the district court apparently found that the inclusion of the word "practice" brought FSA
enforceability under the scope of the FSA. See THAgric. 1, 416 F. Supp. 2d at 1076. The question
that arises is whether reference to "practice" or some corollary is a necessary condition for the appli-
cability of a COL to enforceability, and relatedly, whether the absence of such language leaves the
enforceability issue subject to lexfori.
228. Yavuz, 465 F.3d at 428 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187
cmt. e (1971)).
229. Id. at 425-27.
230. Id. at 425.
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by virtue of the FSA, 23 1 and the parties did argue the issue at length in
their briefs.232 Moreover, both parties argued over whether Yavuz finally
resolved the choice-of-law issue in the instant appeal.233 The Tenth Cir-
cuit's failure to address the issue leaves serious questions as to the
breadth of its decision in Yavuz.
B. The Second Circuit.: Phillips v. Audio Active, Ltd.
The Tenth Circuit's opinion in Yavuz has already led other courts to
consider the applicability of foreign law to FSA analysis.234 In Phillips v.
Audio Active, Ltd.,235 the Second Circuit embarked upon an expansive
analysis, considering choice of law applicability to separate and distinct
FSA issues.236
Phillips arose from a dispute between a recording musician ("Phil-
lips") and a music company ("BBE").237 Phillips and BBE entered into a
recording contract containing an FSA and COL.238 A dispute arose as to
the material BBE was authorized to release, and consequently Phillips
sued BBE and others for breach of contract and infringement.239  The
district court dismissed the case for improper venue based on the FSA.24°
In an interesting approach, the Second Circuit considered the FSA
at issue pursuant to a four-part analysis. 24' In a striking display of clar-
ity, the court proceeded to define and discuss the four-parts. 242 Courts
must first determine if the FSA was "reasonably" conveyed to the resist-
243ing party. Next, courts determine whether the FSA is mandatory or
231. See TH Agric. I, 416 F. Supp. 2d at 1062 ("[D]efendant's motions are granted on the
grounds of a lack of personal jurisdiction and improper venue.") (emphasis added); id. at 1079
("[Elven if the court had personal jurisdiction over defendants, it would enforce the forum selection
clause as mandatory under the law of The Netherlands and dismiss this case for improper venue.)
(emphasis added); id. ("[T]he court has already concluded that this case should be dismissed for lack
of jurisdiction and for improper venue ....") (emphasis added); see also TH Agric. & Nutrition,
LLC v. Ace European Group, Ltd. (TH Agric. I1), 488 F.3d 1282, 1284-85 (10th Cir. 2007) ("The
District Court granted the Insurers' motions to dismiss based on lack of personal jurisdiction over
the Insurers and improper venue.") (emphasis added).
232. See Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 39-46, TH Agric. If, 488 F.3d 1282 (No. 06-3105);
Brief of Respondent-Appellee at 32-48, TH Agric. HI, 488 F.3d 1282 (No. 06-3105); Reply Brief of
Petitioner-Appellant at 1-2, THAgric. 1H, 488 F.3d 1282 (No. 06-3105).
233. Reply Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 1, THAgric. 1H, 488 F.3d 1282 (No. 06-3105).
234. See Phillips v. Audio Active, Ltd., 494 F.3d 378, 385-86 (2d Cit. 2007); Abbott Labs. v.
Takeda Pharm. Co., Ltd., 476 F.3d 421, 423 (7th Cir. 2007); Global Link, LLC v. Karamtech Co.,
No. 06-CV-14948, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33570, at *3 (E.D. Mich. May 8, 2004).
235. 494 F.3d 378 (2d Cir. 2007).
236. See id. at 383-86.
237. Id. at 381.
238. The FSA and choice of law clause states: "[tihe validity[,] construction[,] and effect of
this agreement and any or all modifications hereof shall be governed by English Law and any legal
proceedings that may arise out of it are to be brought in England." Id. at 382 (alteration in original).
239. Id. at 383.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 383-84.
243. Id. at 383 (citing D.H. Blair & Co. v. Gottdiener, 462 F.3d 95, 103 (2d Cir. 2006)); see
also Yackee, supra note 3, at 50, 56-57 (discussing formal validity and reality of consent).
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permissive.244 The third step requires courts to determine whether the
FSA extends to "the claims and parties involved in the suit. '245 If steps
one through three are satisfied, the FSA is "presumptively enforce-
able. 24 6 The presumption of enforceability is, however, rebuttable upon
a showing of unreasonableness or injustice, or invalidity due to fraud or
overreaching.247 In step four, courts must consider whether the resisting
party has sufficiently rebutted the presumption of enforceability.248
Next, the Second Circuit considered the applicability of a COL ac-
companying an FSA.249 The placement of this question in the court's
analysis is curious because it had already presented a framework for FSA
analysis pursuant to United States federal law.250 Accordingly, even if
the court used the law chosen by the parties to analyze the entire FSA,
the analysis would be a hybrid in that foreign law would be applied to an
analytical framework based on United States law. Moreover, by consid-
ering the applicable law after presenting the analytical framework, the
court opened the door for a more complicated arrangement where federal
law may apply to certain parts of FSA analysis, while foreign law may
apply to the remaining issues. In fact, the court did opine that this might
be a suitable result.
251
Characterizing FSA enforceability as a procedural issue,252 the court
decided that federal law, i.e., Bremen, is applicable in the fourth step of
the analysis.253 However, the court was less certain about the applicabil-
254ity of federal law to the interpretation of an FSA's meaning and scope.
In this regard, the court turned to Yavuz, and, mirroring the Tenth Circuit,
stated, "we cannot understand why the interpretation of a forum selection
clause should be singled out for application of any law other than that
chosen to govern the interpretation of the contract as a whole.,
255
Regrettably, the force of the court's reflection was lost. The court
found the parties' failure to object to the district court's use of federal
law, as well as their failure to use English law in their own FSA interpre-
tations, was indicative of their reliance on United States federal law,
244. Phillips, 494 F.3d at 383 (citing John Boutari & Son, Wines & Spirits, S.A. v. Attiki Imps.
& Distribs. Inc., 22 F.3d 51, 53 (2d Cir. 1994)).
245. Id. (citing Roby v. Corp. of Lloyd's, 996 F.2d 1353, 1358-61 (2d Cir. 1993)).
246. Id. (citing Roby, 996 F.2d at 1362-63).
247. Id. at 383-84 (quoting M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 15 (1972)).
248. Id.
249. Id. at 384.
250. See id. at 383-84.
251. See id. at 384-86.
252. Id. at 384 (citing Jones v. Weibrecht, 901 F.2d 17, 19 (2d Cir. 1990)).
253. Id
254. Id. at 385.
255. Id at 386 (citing Yavuz v. 61 MM, Ltd., 465 F.3d 418, 428 (10th Cir. 2006)).
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rather than English law.256 Accordingly, the court proceeded to review
the FSA pursuant to federal law.
257
V. ANALYSIS
The Yavuz opinion is a wakeup call. The opinion signals a major
departure from prior circuit FSA case law in the context of international
transactions and strongly advances the concept of party autonomy. Ya-
vuz poses a serious obstacle to circuit courts' tendency to overlook the
applicability of the law chosen by the parties to FSA analysis. This
should lead to more comprehensive and in-depth circuit opinions. How-
ever, the effect that Yavuz will have on other courts is unclear. Just be-
cause courts are in a position to consider the potential applicability of
COLs does not mean that they will conclude that COLs are ultimately
applicable. Whether or not other circuits follow the Tenth Circuit will
probably turn on their acceptance or rejection of the court's rationale in
Yavuz. While the principles espoused by the Tenth Circuit are easily
articulable, the underlying methodology is not.
A. What Will Courts Say?
In many respects, Yavuz is reminiscent of Bremen.258 While the Ya-
vuz court gave a brief nod to basic conflict of laws principles, 259 its
analysis was largely devoted to review of the international trade implica-
tions260 inherent in FSA analysis.26' To be sure, the policy considerations
are appealing. However, they provide little analytical guidance for future
courts to follow. Whether the Tenth Circuit's methodology will inspire
other circuits is unclear.
On the one hand, despite methodological deficiencies,262 federal
courts, with modest variation, generally adhere to Bremen.263 The bright
line rule from Bremen offers courts a judicially crafted substitute for a
more complex conflict of laws analysis. As Yavuz offers a similar substi-
tute, courts may find its facial simplicity appealing. However, as opin-
256. Id. Similarly, in K & V Scientific, the parties failed to incorporate their chosen law into
their FSA arguments. K & V Scientific Co. v. Bayerische Motoren Werke Aktiengesellschaft, 314
F.3d 494, 497 n.4 (10th Ci. 2002); see also supra notes 129-30 and accompanying text.
257. Phillips, 494 F.3d at 386-87.
258. See Mullenix, supra note 54, at 312 ("The linchpin of The Bremen's approval of forum-
selection clauses, however, lay in policy considerations rather than doctrinal support.").
259. Yavuz, 465 F.3d at 427-28 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICr OF LAWS § 187
cmt. e (1971)).
260. Id. at 428-30.
261. The Tenth Circuit's focus on international trade implications is reminiscent of the Su-
preme Court's analysis in The Bremen. See Mullenix, supra note 54, at 312 ("The linchpin of The
Bremen's approval of forum-selection clauses, however, lay in policy considerations rather than
doctrinal support.").
262. See Mullenix, supra note 54, at 306-15.
263. See Gruson, supra note 47, at 149 ("Federal courts have universally agreed that the teach-
ing of Bremen is not limited to admiralty cases nor to cases involving the selection of a foreign
forum but applies to all forum-selection clauses .... ").
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ions of the Tenth Circuit do not carry the force of Supreme Court pro-
nouncements, other courts may scrutinize the holding in Yavuz to a
greater degree than they have Bremen.
1. The Scope of Yavuz
Scrutiny of the Yavuz holding uncovers numerous problems. The
scope of Yavuz is exceedingly vague. The Tenth Circuit was clear in its
position that, where a contract contains a COL, rote application of lex
fori to consider FSAs is unacceptable.264 Moreover, the court took pains
to emphasize its holding that effect should be given an FSA, "as con-
strued under the law specified in the agreement's choice-of-law provi-
sion."265  Clearly, this mandate covers the "meaning" of an FSA.26 6
While the court did little to define "meaning," it is likely that "meaning"
corresponds to Yackee's concept of "content of consent." 267 However, it
is unclear if the mandate extends to other issues concerning enforceabil-
ity, formal validity, and aspects of non-formal validity.268
The court's failure to address enforceability is especially disconcert-
ing. There is vague evidence that the court made an effort to incorporate
enforceability into its holding. Particularly, two statements in Yavuz may
implicate enforceability. First, the court stated, "respect for the parties'
autonomy and the demands of predictability in international transactions
require courts to give effect to the meaning of the forum-selection clause
under the chosen law, at least absent special circumstances.' 269 Next,
building on Bremen, the Tenth Circuit stated, "under federal law the
courts should ordinarily honor an international commercial agreement's
forum-selection provision as construed under the law specified in the
agreement's choice-of-law provision."270 However, the court's language
here is ambiguous. It is unclear whether the terms "give effect" and
"honor" are synonymous with "enforce." On the one hand, the terms
could mean that courts should interpret FSAs pursuant to the law chosen
by the parties and enforce the FSA pursuant to that same law. Another
264. Yavuz, 465 F.3d at 430-31 (referring to Yackee, supra note 3, at 83).
265. Id. at 430 (emphasis in original).
266. Id. In passing, the court also indicated that the questions concerning which claims and
parties were subject to the FSA were to be addressed by the parties chosen law. See id. at 43 1.
267. See Yackee, supra note 3, at 60-62.
268. See id. at 47-62. This issue presents a catch-22 for courts. Inevitably, where one party
files suit in a forum not contemplated in the FSA, lexfori will be applicable to a degree. Even in an
extreme scenario, where a forum automatically enforces FSAs without analysis, the automatic en-
forcement would, obviously, be a rule of the forum (i.e, lexfori). Accordingly, the question is not
one of replacing lexfori with the law chosen by the parties, but limiting the scope of lexfori to base
preliminary matters. Choosing the FSA issues to which a COL will apply requires that the seized
court introduce a lexfori framework upon which the law chosen by the parties will apply. A pro
party autonomy approach that would limit the application of lexfori in this regard might dictate that
the law chosen by the parties shall govern all FSA issues. Here, however, the court only explicitly
addressed meaning, thus raising the question of COL applicability to other FSA issues.
269. Yavuz, 465 F.3d at 430 (emphasis added).
270. Id. (first emphasis added).
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possibility is that the scope of the court's holding concerned only mean-
ing, not enforceability. The Tenth Circuit distinguished Yavuz from Su-
preme Court cases where the only issue was FSA enforceability, not
meaning.27' However, it is unclear if the court in Yavuz was concerned
with the inverse, meaning only, not enforceability. Another plausible
interpretation is that courts should interpret FSAs pursuant to the law
chosen by the parties and enforce them pursuant to some other legal
principle, e.g., federal law. The court's guidance that courts should "or-
dinarily honor" 272 FSAs in international agreements may implicate this
latter interpretation. That the courts should "ordinarily honor an interna-
tional commercial agreement's forum-selection provision,, 273 implies
that in some circumstances they should not. Here, lexfori again enters
the picture.
It is unclear exactly when circumstances that are not "ordinary" will
arise. The court alluded to "special circumstances '274 that may occasion
a departure from honoring an FSA "as construed under the law specified
in the agreement's choice-of-law provision."275 The court noted that a
special circumstance might arise when a jurisdiction with no ties to a
case declines to entertain it.276 However, this fails to inform courts and
parties of what other special circumstances may be. Courts may find that
the Bremen exceptions are "special circumstances," thus essentially re-
storing the old federal law standard to the determination of enforceabil-
ity. If the Tenth Circuit envisioned "special circumstances" that do not
correspond to the Bremen, then Yavuz has created a new federal standard
that is perhaps contrary to the Supreme Court rule. Unless distinguish-
able, such a move may overstep the Tenth Circuit's authority.
271. Id.
272. Id. (emphasis added).
273. Id. (emphasis added).
274. Id.
275. Id. (emphasis in original).
276. Id.
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a. Procedural or Substantive?
277
As has already happened,278 courts may decide not to alter the fed-
eral law concerning enforceability at all. In Phillips, the Second Circuit
chose not to depart from the Bremen standard in its consideration of FSA
enforceability because, according to the court, enforcement is a proce-
dural issue. 279  The classification of FSA enforcement as procedural or
substantive280 adds a level of doctrinal support that that would have en-
hanced the Tenth Circuit's opinion in Yavuz. Regrettably, as the Yavuz
court did not explicitly discuss enforcement, neither did it reach the issue
of substance and procedure.281
Additionally, it is unclear if the mandatory/permissive issue quali-
fies as substantive or procedural law. Although the court in Yavuz
clearly indicated that its ruling applied to interpreting the meaning of
FSAs,282 its support for the application was largely conclusory. The
Phillips court did not rule as a matter of law that federal law does not
apply to the mandatory/permissive question. However, the Phillips court
did question the logic of interpreting an FSA pursuant to a law different
from the one employed to interpret the rest of the contract.283 In light of
277. The designation of an issue as procedural or substantive will often clarify the applicable
law. Generally, lexfori governs procedural issues, even where another law applies to substantive
issues. See Combs v. Int'l Ins. Co., 354 F.3d 568, 579 (6th Cir. 2004) (quoting Slater v. Mexican
Nat'l R.R. Co., 194 U.S. 120, 126 (1904)); JOSEPH STORY, STORY ON CONFLICT OF LAWS 756-59
(Boston, Little, Brown and Co. 1865). See generally Erwin Spiro, Forum Regit Processum (Proce-
dure Is Governed by the Lex Fori), 18 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 949, 949-50 (1969) (giving an expansive
review of theforum regitprocessum doctrine beginning with Balduinus). There is significant debate
as to whether FSA issues are procedural or substantive. See Phillips v. Audio Active, Ltd., 494 F.3d
378, 384 (2d Cir 2007) (characterizing FSA enforcement as procedural and thus subject to federal
law); Jumara v. State Farm Ins. Co., 55 F.3d 873, 877 (3d Cir. 1995) (stating that because the forum
selection enforcement question is essentially procedural, "[i]n federal court, the effect to be given a
contractual forum selection clause in diversity cases is determined by federal not state law."); Jones
v. Weibrecht, 901 F.2d 17, 19 (2d Cir. 1990) ("Questions of venue and the enforcement of forum
selection clauses are essentially procedural, rather than substantive, in nature."); Korean Press
Agency, Inc. v. Yonhap News Agency, 421 F. Supp. 2d 775, 778 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (following
Jones). But see Sun Forest Corp. v. Shvili, 152 F. Supp. 2d 367, 381 n.22 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (ques-
tioning but ultimately following the Second Circuit's application of The Bremen to diversity ac-
tions). The distinction between matters of substance and procedure is often unclear. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 122 cmt. b (1971); RUSSELL J. WEINTRAUB,
COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, 59-62 (5th ed. 2006). Accordingly, some authorities
caution against the rote designation of an issue as procedural or substantive. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 122 cmt. b (1971). A more searching analysis may be required
as to the nature of the issue in question and the law that should govern. Id. § 122 cmt. a;
WEINTRAUB, supra, at 59-62.
278. See Phillips, 494 F.3d at 384.
279. Id. (citing Jones, 901 F.2d at 19).
280. Perhaps more appropriately, the concern should be whether the "rules prescrib[e] how
litigation shall be conducted." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 122 (1971).
281. The Tenth Circuit has not addressed the issue at the domestic level either. See ADT Sec.
Servs. v. Apex Alarm, LLC, 430 F. Supp. 2d 1199, 1201-02 (D. Colo. 2006) ("The authorities are
divided on the question whether enforcement of a forum selection clause is a procedural-governed
by federal law-or substantive-governed by state law... [t]he Tenth Circuit has not ruled expressly
on this issue.").
282. Yavuz, 465 F.3d at 430.
283. Phillips, 494 F.3d at 386.
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the Second Circuit's determination that enforceability is distinguishable
from interpretation because enforceability is a procedural issue, it is in-
ferable that interpretation is not a procedural issue, but a substantive is-
sue. 28 4 However, a number of district courts have reached the opposite
conclusion, classifying the mandatory/permissive issue as procedural
and, thus, subject to federal law.285 One district court has indicated that
this is the majority rule in federal courts.286 Had the Tenth Circuit taken
a stance on the issue, it would have added a level of doctrinal support
that the Yavuz opinion needs. Unfortunately, the court failed to address
the issue, thus opening the door for courts to disregard its holding on the
grounds that interpreting the meaning of an FSA is a procedural matter
and, thus, subject to federal law.287
b. What Does Law Mean?
The fact that a forum may have different sets of law applicable to an
FSA analysis raises perhaps the most complex issue unaddressed by the
Tenth Circuit in Yavuz. Which of the chosen forum's laws should apply
and which, if any, should be excluded? Should courts look only to the
domestic law of the chosen forum or should they also consider the pri-
vate international law288 of the chosen forum?
284. See, e.g., Jones, 901 F.2d at 19.
285. In Wells Fargo Century, Inc. v. Brown, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
New York stated that deciding the mandatory/permissive question is the initial step of enforcement
and, as enforcement is a procedural issue, the mandatory/permissive question is governed by federal
law. 475 F. Supp. 2d 369, 370-71 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (quoting Jones, 901 F.2d at 19). In another
opinion from the Southem District of New York, the court cited a Second Circuit case classifying
forum selection questions as procedural in support of its conclusion that "[t]he validity and scope of
the [] forum selection clause is governed by federal law." Kingsway Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Pricewater-
house-Coopers, LLP, 420 F. Supp. 2d 228, 234 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (quoting Jones, 901 F.2d at 19). In
Bentley v. Mutual Benefits Corp., the Southern District of Mississippi stated, "it appears that courts
making the initial permissive/mandatory determination also use federal law, possibly because of the
procedural nature of venue and the federal interest in venue matters." 237 F. Supp. 2d 699, 703 n.7
(S.D. Miss. 2002) (citing Manetti-Farrow, Inc. v. Gucci America, 858 F.2d 509, 513 (9th Cir.
1988)). However, the court in Bentley ultimately declined to give a definitive answer to the issue as
there were no material discrepancies between the laws at issue. Id. On two occasions, the Northern
District of Illinois has indicated that the classification of the mandatory/permissive issue as proce-
dural rather than substantive and, thus, subject to federal law is the majority rule in federal courts.
Dearborn Indus. Mfg. Co. v. Soudronic Finanz AG, No. 95 C 4414, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11722,
at *10 (N.D. 111. Aug. 13, 1996); Frediani & Delgreco, S.P.A. v. Gina Imports, Ltd., 870 F. Supp.
217, 219-20 (N.D. I11. 1994).
286. See Dearborn, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11722, at *10 n.3 (stating that by employing the
rationale that the mandatory/permissive question was a procedural issue and subject to federal law, it
was "follow[ing] the opinion of a majority of the courts on this issue."); Frediani & Delgreco, 870
F. Supp. at 219-20 ("[Tlhe majority of courts have held that federal common law governs as to the
enforceability and interpretation of forum selection clauses, reasoning that venue is a procedural
issue, not a substantive issue.").
287. Alternatively, courts may take the approach that FSAs are separable from the underlying
agreement. See BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 3, at 501. Under this view, a COL that applies to
the underlying agreement does not necessarily apply to the FSA, unless specifically indicated. See
id Here, the substantive/procedural question is irrelevant unless the agreement specifies that the
COL applies to the FSA.
288. Private international law is synonymous with "[i]nternational conflict of laws." BLACK'S,
supra note 1, at 835.
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The latter question puts courts in the unenviable position of consid-
ering the "Sphinx-like ' 289 question of renvoi.290 A basic renvoi scenario
may implicate the law of only two States, the State of the seized court
and the State of the chosen forum.291 Applying the rule from Yavuz, the
seized court would apply the law of the chosen forum. However, for any
number of reasons, the conflict of laws rules of the chosen forum may
dictate the exclusive applicability of the seized forum's law. But the
rules of the seized court dictate the exclusive applicability of the law of
the chosen forum. As the conflict of laws rules of each forum assign
applicability to the other, the exchange will continue ad infinitum.292
A more complex situation exists where multiple States are involved.
The following hypothetical illustrates this scenario. Party A, the buyer,
and Party B, the seller, contract in State 1 for the sale of widgets manu-
factured in State 2 to be delivered in State 3. In order to pass from State
2 to State 3, the widgets must pass through State 4. The parties' contract
designates the court of State 2 as the exclusive forum and the law of
State 2 as the law governing the contract. In transit, the widgets are
damaged and held in storage in State 4. Party A then sues in State 3.
State 3, following Yavuz, employs the law, including the conflict of laws
rules, chosen by the parties, i.e., the law of State 2. However, the con-
flict laws rules of State 2 designate as applicable the lex loci contrac-
tus,293 i.e., the law of State 1. In turn, the conflict of laws rules of State 1
designate as applicable the lex rei sitae,294 i.e., the law of State 4. Con-
tinuing the trend, the conflict of laws rules of State 4 designate as appli-
cable lexfori, i.e., the law of State 3. Upon returning to the seized fo-
rum, the cycle through the laws of the concerned States will continue
perpetually, never settling on a final applicable law.
The latter subverts the essential principles from Yavuz, i.e., "cer-
,,295 .tewrtainty, predictability, and convenience, in the worst possible way.
Parties will have to litigate, not under one unforeseen legal system, but
under many. Moreover, the perpetual cycle through conflict of laws
stands to deny the plaintiff his or her day in court.
289. Martin Davies, Note, Neilson v. Overseas Projects Corporation of Victoria Ltd: Renvoi
andPresumptions About Foreign Law, 30 MELB. U. L. REv. 244, 245 (2006).
290. Renvoi is "[t]he problem arising when one state's rule on conflict of laws refers a case to
the law of another state, and that second state's conflict-of-law rule refers the case either back to the
law of the first state or to a third state." BLACK'S, supra note 1, at 1324; see also Larry Kramer,
Return of the Renvoi, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 979,979-80 (1991).
291. See Kramer, supra note 290, at 980.
292. See Davies, supra note 289, at 245.
293. Lex loci contractus is "[t]he law of the place where a contract is executed or to be per-
formed." BLACK'S, supra note I, at 930. This scenario employs the former.
294. Lex rei sitae is "[t]he law of the place where the property is situated." BLACK'S, supra
note 1, at 931.
295. See Yavuz v. 61 MM, Ltd., 465 F.3d 418, 428 (10th Cir. 2006) (quoting RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 cmt. e (1971)).
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Not surprisingly, various conflict of laws schemes set limits on the
applicability of conflict of laws rules of a State other than those of the
seized court.296 For example, the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT
OF LAWS ("Restatement") 297 addresses circumstances where a forum's
conflict of laws rules requires the application of "the law" of another
state.298 Here, subject to two exceptions,299 the Restatement counsels
courts to apply the "local law" of the other state.300 "Local law" as used
in the Restatement refers to the law of a state exclusive of that state's
choice of law rules.30 1 The traditional practice of the Hague Conven-
tions302 goes one-step further, excluding "any form of renvoi.,,303 Aca-
demics have reached varying conclusions, arguing for and against ren-
voi304
Whether courts should apply the private international law of the fo-
rum chosen by the parties is a complex question that requires intensive
consideration. Predictability and consistency, however, require clear
guidance.
B. Party Considerations
1. Autonomy, Consistency, and Predictability
The general principle articulated in Yavuz will have varying effects
on parties litigating in the Tenth Circuit. Lack of clarity in the Yavuz
holding leaves numerous questions pertaining to its scope unanswered.
Taken to one extreme, Yavuz affords parties some measure of auton-
296. One example is the Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Certain Rights in Re-
spect of Securities Held with an Intermediary art. 11(2), July 5, 2006, http://www.hcch.net/index_
en.php?act-conventions.text& cid=72. The Rome Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual
Obligations similarly excludes renvoi. See Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obli-
gations art. 15, opened for signature June 19, 1980, http://www.rome-convention.org/instruments/
i-conv orig_en.htm. Whether the Rome Convention's exclusion of Renvoi is sound has sparked
some debate. See, e.g., Adrian Briggs, In Praise and Defense of Renvoi, 47 INT'L & COMP. L.Q.
877, 880-81 (1998) (questioning the logic of the Rome Convention's exclusion of renvoi).
297. "The rules in the Restatement [of Conflict of Laws] are [] usually applicable to cases with
elements in one or more foreign nations [because] similar values and considerations are involved in
both interstate and international cases." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 10 cmt.
c (1971). For exceptions to the Restatement's general applicability in the international context see
id. cmt. d.
298. Id. § 8.
299. Id. §§ 8(2), (3).
300. Id. § 8(1).
301. Id. § 8 cmt. a.
302. "Hague Convention" is "the short name for any one of the many international conventions
that address different legal issues and attempt to standardize procedures between nations."
BLACK'S, supra note 1, at 730.
303. See Permanent Bureau, Hague Conference on Private International Law, The Law Appli-
cable to Dispositions of Securities Held Through Indirect Holding Systems at 41 (Nov. 2000, Prelim.
Doc. No. 1), http://hcch.e-vision.nl/upload/sec._pdO Ie.pdf.
304. See Briggs, supra note 296, at 881 (arguing in favor of renvoi), Kramer, supra note 290,
at 984-1012 (reviewing competition positions on renvoi.); id. at 1044 (summarizing an analytical
approach to the renvoi problem); Zhang, supra note 30, at 521-22 (discussing varying views on
renvoi).
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omy 30 5 and consistency. 0 6 Interpreting and enforcing FSAs pursuant to
the law chosen by the parties affords litigating parties, especially foreign
ones, some measure30 7 of predictability. 30 8 However, a necessary impli-
cation of the holding in Yavuz is that, even if it extends to enforceability,
exceptions exist in certain circumstances. 30 9  To determine whether a
special circumstance has arisen in a particular case, parties will have to
litigate under federal law, thus frustrating predictability. 310  Moreover,
uncertainty as to the applicability of the chosen forum's private interna-
tional law exacerbates the lack of predictability.
2. Enforcement
Whether the application of the parties chosen law to FSA determi-
nations will further efforts to enforce FSAs depends upon the particular
issue under consideration. In terms of the exclusive/permissive question,
the application of European law over United States law will most likely
lead to a higher rate of enforcement. As evidenced in the cases discussed
in this article,3" United States courts are inclined to find FSAs permis-
sive absent specific language to the contrary.312 The situation in Europe
is generally the opposite.31 3 There, exclusivity is presumed unless the
parties provide an alternate indication.314
Ironically, however, and depending upon the scope future courts at-
tach to the holding in Yavuz, application of foreign law may frustrate
parties' attempts to enforce an FSA. In several respects, United States
FSA law is more lenient than European FSA law.315 For example, some
European schemes incorporate strict writing requirements.316 Alterna-
tively, courts in the United States tend to be more lenient in this re-
305. See Yackee, supra note 3, at 85.
306. Id. ("This principle-that the explicitly selected law should govern the FSA ... maintains
the unity of the contract by assuring that the same law is applied to different contract provisions.").
307. The failure of parties to brief the applicability of the law chosen in their contracts in the
past raises questions as to whether there is an expectation to begin with. See, e.g., Phillips v. Audio
Active, Ltd., 494 F.3d 378, 386.
308. See Yackee, supra note 3, at 45, 96.
309. See Yavuz v. 61 MM, Ltd., 465 F.3d 418, 430 (10th Cir. 2006).
310. See id.
311. See supra Part I.B.
312. See Yackee, supra note 3, at 60-62.
313. See id. at 61; see also Loi Federale Suisse sur le Droit International Prive du 18 Decembre
1987 [Federal Statute on Private International Law of December 18, 1987], FF 1988 1 5, art.5
(Switz.) (see the English translation, Jean-Claude Cornu, et al., Swiss Federal Statute on Private
International Law of December 18, 1987 (LSU translation), 37 AM. J. COMP. L. 193, 196 (1989)).
The Convention on Choice of Court Agreements appears to have adopted the European model. See
Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, supra note 9, art. 3(b) ("(A] choice of court agreement,
which designates the courts of one Contracting State or one or more specific courts of one Contract-
ing State shall be deemed to be exclusive unless the parties have expressly provided otherwise.").
314. See Yackee, supra note 3, at 61 (quoting Council Regulation 44/2001, art. 23, 2001 O.J.
(L 12 1)).
315. See id. at49, 51-52, 54, 56-57.
316. Id. at 52; see also Federale, supra note 313, at 196.
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gard.3t7 Accordingly, a party seeking enforcement of an FSA with for-
mal validity deficiencies would be better served using United States FSA
law.
318
C. The Convention on Choice of Court Agreements
On June 30, 2005, the twentieth session of the Hague Conference on
Private International Law concluded the Convention on Choice of Court
Agreements ("Convention"). 31 9  The Convention has yet to enter into
force due to lack of requisite ratifications. 320  However, if ratified by the
United States, 321 the Convention will limit322 the applicability of the rule
espoused in Yavuz. The Convention settles questions regarding the law
applicable to FSAs by creating a single set of rules covering certain is-
sues 3 2 3 and specifically designating the law of a particular State to cover
other issues. 324  As these rules trump the domestic law of Contracting
States, the Convention would replace much of the ground covered by the
rule espoused in Yavuz. However, the Convention, if ratified by the
United States, will not obviate the necessity to clarify the Yavuz holding.
Due to its limited scope,325 the Convention will not be applicable in nu-
merous cases. Thus, even if the Convention enters into force, federal
courts' need of a clear standard for the application of COLs to FSAs will
persist.
317. See Yackee, supra note 3, at 51.
318. However, assuming that the parties drafted the FSA with the COL in mind, the FSA
should meet the demands of the chosen law. Whether parties draft with this level of foresight is
unclear. See Phillips v. Audio Active, Ltd., 494 F.3d 378, 386 (2d Cir 2007) (discussing the parties'
lack of reliance on their chosen law in interpreting the FSA in their briefs).
319. Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, supra note 9.
320. See supra note 10.
321. Currently, the Choice of Court Convention needs only one ratification to enter into force.
See id.
322. The Choice of Court Convention will limit the applicability of the Yavuz holding in some
cases, but not all. The Choice of Court Convention excludes a broad array of issues ranging from
employment contracts to certain types of intellectual property rights. Convention on Choice of
Court Agreements, supra note 9, art. 2. Moreover, The Choice of Court Convention allows ratifying
states to make declarations that limit the Convention's applicability. See id. arts. 19-21. Limitations
to the scope of the Choice of Court Convention dictate that the Convention will not render the rule
from Yavuz entirely obsolete. Therefore, the Tenth Circuit should endeavor to clarify the scope and
holding of its rule.
323. For instance, the Choice of Court Convention settles the exclusive/permissive issue dis-
cussed in supra Parts I.B, IV.B by creating a uniform rule advising that FSAs "shall be deemed to be
exclusive unless the parties have expressly provided otherwise." Id. art. 3(b).
324. For instance, the Choice of Court Convention requires that seized courts "suspend or
dismiss proceedings to which an exclusive choice of court agreement applies unless--(a) the agree-
ment is null and void under the law of the State of the chosen court, (b) a party lacked the capacity to
conclude the agreement under the law of the State of the court seised; (c) giving effect to the agree-
ment would lead to a manifest injustice or would be manifestly contrary to the public policy of the
State of the court seised .... " Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, supra note 9, art. 6(a)-
(c) (emphasis added).
325. See supra note 322.
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CONCLUSION
The Tenth Circuit's decision in Yavuz has brought parties to interna-
tional commercial transactions one-step closer to true party autonomy in
dispute resolution. Applying the law chosen by the parties to FSA de-
terminations also grants parties predictability that is an absolute necessity
in the modem international commercial world. The rule established,
while signifying a giant leap forward, is in need of clarification and doc-
trinal support. In future cases, the Tenth Circuit should clarify the scope
of its rule and address the procedural/substantive question. Regardless of
whether other circuit courts accept the rule espoused in Yavuz, the opin-
ion will almost certainly require consideration of the applicability of
COLs to FSAs. That, in itself, is a step in the right direction.
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